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Abstract
This paper deals with two issues concerning the effects of population ag-
ing on education decisions in the presence of a PAYG pension system: We first
analyze the effects of an aging population per se on individual skill choices
and continuous education and the production structure. Second, we study
the implications of postponed retirement, which is often proposed as a mea-
sure to cope with the economic challenges of increased longevity. Our study
uses a dynamic general equilibrium framework with overlapping genera-
tions and probabilistic aging. The model allows for capital-skill complemen-
tarity in the production of final output. As a response to population aging, in
a small open economy with a fixed interest rate, our first simulation shows
that GDP is depressed due to an adverse effect on skill choice and labor sup-
ply. We then introduce postponed retirement as a potentially dampening
policy measure due to its encouragement of human capital formation. How-
ever, since there is less private saving in this scenario, the overall effect on
GDP is even worse than in the pure aging scenario.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the macroeconomic relevance of edu-
cation and human capital formation in an aging society. This topic has received
much attention over the last years, mainly due to the expected sharp increase in
the share of the retired over the working population (cf. figure 1). Moreover,
older workers are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages.1 This
decline in labor force participation, which magnifies population trends, is due to
specific characteristics of existing pension systems, which impose considerable
negative accrual rates of pension wealth.
In order to compensate the adverse effects of the shift in the age structure on
Figure 1
Dependency ratio projections for
Switzerland. The solid line shows the trend
extrapolation, the dashed line a more
pessimistic scenario.
Source: BFS (2001)
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production, labor productivity of the working needs to increase or retirement
must be postponed.2 We analyze the direct effect of a change in the age structure
due to aging on the individuals’ incentives to invest in education at the extensive
margin. Indeed, aging itself strongly affects the skill structure of the workforce
by changing the distribution of the workers’ seniority. However, additional pol-
icy measures towards increased human capital investment would have to be put
in place in order to maintain total employment and to assure the financial vi-
ability of existing pension systems. We show that postponed retirement raises
educational attainment and human capital. However, it induces individuals to
save less, which offsets these beneficial effects.
1An extensive source on retirement behavior in industrialized countries is Gruber and Wise (1999).
2Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003) argues that the decrease in the relative size of the economically active popula-
tion cannot be balanced by higher capital intensity. Hence, the strengthening of human capital formation
assumes high importance in the face of an aging population.
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In this paper, individuals’ intensive and extensive education decision is stud-
ied, along with their intertemporal consumption choice and labor supply. To be
able to simulate a concrete population and policy scenario, the model realisti-
cally reproduces (1) individual life-cycle wage and consumption profiles; (2) the
skill composition in the labor force; (3) skill premia in wages; (4) the change in
relative prices and the production structure due to an aging population and post-
poned retirement. We use an overlapping generations (OLG) approach in general
equilibrium in order to be able to analyze intergenerational distribution effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We first giv a short overview
of the literature related to our subject. Based on the probabilistic aging approach,
we thenmotivate ourmodeling of the production technology allowing for capital-
skill complementarity. Third, we present a stylized model in order to highlight
important economic effects showing up in our quantitative analysis. We then
discuss the calibration of the model. Finally, we simulate the effects of aging and
postponed retirement on key macro variables in an open economy setting.
2 Related Literature
In its complexity, the model relates to four strands of economic literature:
Education and the Economy Besides the vast literature on life-cycle human
capital investment, which focuses on the intensive margin of education, there
is a strand of literature concentrating on the extensive margin.3 This mostly em-
pirical literature is concerned with self-selection of students into skill types ac-
cording to ability types which affects estimates of occupational choice and the
distribution of earnings. The first source is Roy (1951), which has received subse-
quent elaboration, e.g. by Heckman and Honore´ (1990). Willis and Rosen (1979)
and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) derive a theoretical model of the de-
mand for college attendance and empirically show that expected lifetime earn-
ings indeed influence the college attendance choice decisively. Due to the specific
nature of their sample, there is no ability bias in the estimation of the enrollment
function, a problemwhich is often encountered in the empirical assessment of the
rate of return to education. Bils and Klenow (2000) argue that not only schooling
3Early references in the life-cycle human capital investment literature are Becker (1962) and Mincer
(1974). Ben-Porath (1967) formulates a rigorousmodel whichmakes the analogy between human capital
and investment in physical capital explicit. Weiss (1986) provides an extensive review of the theoretical
literature, while Mincer (1997) reviews the empirical literature.
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leads to higher growth rates, such as in Barro (1991), but that there is also a re-
verse channel throughwhich faster growth can induce more schooling by raising
its effective return.
Overlapping Generations Economic models with overlapping generations of
households provide a good basis for the analysis of fiscal policy and intertempo-
ral macroeconomics. There are basically two strands of OLG literature: The one
with a large number of generations and detailed life-cycle patterns pioneered by
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) with refinements by e.g. I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu,
and Joines (1999) and Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001).
The second strand bases upon the model by Ramsey (1928) with infinitely lived
consumers. Blanchard (1985) introduces constant mortality hazard, which leads
to potentially finite lifetimes but eternal youth. The model by Gertler (1999) in-
troduces life-cycle behavior in this framework by allowing mortality only for
the retired. We base our approach on its consequent enhancement by Grafen-
hofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005), who introduce probabilistic ag-
ing, which allows for mortality among young ages and thereby exhibits a closer
approximation of the demographic structure.
Old-Age Provision There is a vast literature on the economics of old-age pro-
vision, arguing that the design of old-age provision considerably affects labor
market participation and early retirement.4 Martı´n (2003) and Keuschnigg and
Keuschnigg (2004) use computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to analyze
how pension system reformsmay be able to alleviate the expected financial diffi-
culties of current PAYG systems. Lau and Poutvaara (2000, 2001) study the impact
of social security incentives on human capital formation, arguing that actuarial
fairness and a tight contributions-benefit link increase human capital along with
an increase in the retirement age. I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Joines (1995)
derive optimal social security replacement rates and associated benefits bymeans
of an applied general equilibriummodel.
Demographic Transition The demographic transition in industrialized coun-
tries with lower fertility and higher life-expectancy poses challenges to pension
systems and the economy as awhole (cf. e.g. Miles, 1999, Bo¨rsch-Supan andWin-
ter, 2001, and Bovenberg and Knaap, 2005). Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003) argues that in
order to finance the pension system, contribution and tax rates will have to rise,
which reduces labor force participation of the younger cohorts and destabilizes
4Recent contributions are Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000), Mitchell and Phillips (2000), Cre´mer and Pestieau
(2003), Bu¨tler, Huguenin, and Teppa (2004), and Gruber and Wise (2005).
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the pension system even more. In a model with imperfect substitutability be-
tween less and more experienced workers, Rojas (2005) shows that the effects of
aging are less hazardous than with perfectly substitutable workers. Also, Conesa
and Krueger (1999) consider heterogeneous agents and their impact on the polit-
ical support for a funded pension system.
Besides its adverse effects on the pension system, population aging may induce
individuals to invest more in education and postpone retirement.5 The contri-
bution of this paper is an analysis of these effects by means of a model featuring
a realistic production structure with differentiated labor inputs and coherent ed-
ucation decisions in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations
based on probabilistic aging, as developed in Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg, and
Keuschnigg (2005) and Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005).
3 Capital-Skill-Complementarity
Many life-cycle models with overlapping generations, such as the original Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987) model, but also e.g. Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smet-
ters, and Walliser (2001) assume labor to be homogeneous. Recently, heteroge-
neous labor has been introduced in various ways: Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1998) use labor which is differentiated by skill level, while Rojas (2005) uses a
labor market characterized by imperfect substitutability between less and more
experienced workers, hence introducing a vertical differentiation of labor. In our
model, the individuals’ discrete education choice leads to a partition of the work-
ing population into different skill classes, which is mirrored on the production
side, where the firms’ technology uses as inputs differentiated labor and capi-
tal, hence giving rise to a horizontal differentiation of labor. For simplicity, we
assume that the experience of workers does not alter their type of labor.
The surge in skill-biased information technology during the 1990s, which coin-
cided with a rise in the wages of skilled workers relative to those of unskilled
workers, suggests that various kinds of labor are of different substitutability
with capital. The first evidence of this phenomenon is due to Griliches (1969),
5Swanson and Kopecky (1999), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil
(2000), Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002, 2002a), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Huang, Fulginiti, and
Peterson (2003), Soares (2005), Echevarrı´a (2004), and Ferreira and de Abreu Pessoˆa (2005) consistently
find that human capital accumulation and economic growth are increased via these channels – possibly
even without changes in the social security system.
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who refers to his finding that capital and skilled labor are more complementary
as inputs than are capital and unskilled labor as the capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis. The hypothesis has received broad attention in the macroeconomic
literature, where evidence in its favor has important implications on how to spec-
ify aggregate production in theory, but also in reassessing the robustness of ex-
isting empirical findings. Quantitative implications of the hypothesis are studied
e.g. by Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004) who find only weak ev-
idence in support of it, however. The hypothesis has also been tested in many
microeconomic studies with firm and industry-level data. For a representative
sample of such studies cf. Hamermesh (1993), who concludes that there is strong
evidence for capital-skill complementarity. However, he cautions that many of
the studies that disaggregate the workforce by demographic group exclude capi-
tal as a productive input due to the lack of a reliable measure of the capital stock.
The assumption of competitive markets allows early studies to proxy variations
in the capital stock by variations in the rates of return. More recent studies refrain
from this assumption and explicitly include the stock of capital in their analysis
(cf. Duffy, Papageorgiou and Perez, 2004).
Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that physical capital and skills have not always
been viewed as relative complements: In an earlier era, the transformation from
skilled artisan shops to factories involved the substitution of physical capital and
unskilled labor for highly skilled labor – precisely the opposite of what is hypoth-
esized to be happening today. This suggests that capital-skill complementarity
may be a transitory phenomenon: In a country’s development process, skilled
labor may change from being well substitutable with capital and unskilled labor
to being highly complementary to these two inputs. In order to account for this,
recent studies consider panel data over long periods of time (e.g. Duff, Papageor-
giou and Perez, 2004) or split the full country sample into subsamples of similar
development (e.g. Papageorgiou and Chmelarova, 2003). A consistent finding
also supported by Galor and Weil (2000) is that the capital-skill complementarity
is especially strong at the beginning of a development process and may fade out
when a technology becomes widely adopted.
The observed increase in the skill premium during the 1990s in developed coun-
tries may be due to skill-biased technological change, as is brought forward e.g.
by Acemoglu (1998), who argues that an increase in the supply of skills reduces
the skill premium in the short run, but induces biased technological change and
hence increases the skill premium in the long run. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull,
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and Violante (2000) challenge this view in an empirical study, where they find
that with capital-skill complementarity, changes in observed inputs in the ag-
gregate production function alone account for most of the variations in the skill
premium.
To our knowledge, the approach in this paper is the first to employ a production
technology with potentially many types of labor and capital-skill complementar-
ity in a general equilibrium OLG framework. We start by describing a stylized
model exemplifying the main channels, through which the shocks in the scenar-
ios affect economic outcomes in our model. The according building blocks of the
actual CGE model are described in the appendix.
4 Illustrative Simple Model
As discussed in Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005), the human capital
accumulation process over the lifecycle can be analyzed independently of other
life-cycle choices, such as optimum consumption and leisure. Therefore, in this
section, we concentrate on extensive and intensive education decisions and on
the specifics of the production technology.
4.1 Production Technology
For an illustration of capital-skill complementarity in production, consider the
simple production function
Y = f
(
K, L1, L2
)
=
(
K + L1
)ϑ (
L2
)1−ϑ
where capital K and unskilled labor L1 are perfect substitutes and have unit elas-
ticity of substitution with skilled labor L2.6 The ratio of the marginal products of
skilled to unskilled labor, and accordingly the relative wage of high skilled labor,
is
w2
w1
=
fL2
fL1
=
1− ϑ
ϑ
K + L1
L2
. (1)
6Note that in order to have capital-skill complementarity with this specific functional form, deviating
from the functional form in (25), capital has to be nested together with unskilled labor.
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This will determine human wealth in the respective skill classes and govern the
extensive education decision at the beginning of the life-cycle. It also constitutes
the relative labor demand in figure 4.
4.2 Human Capital Production
For the illustrative purpose of this section, we consider two different types of hu-
man capital s ∈ {1, 2} , which constitute skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
Low-skilled productivity is denoted by θ1, while high-skilled productivity is θ2.
Time and individual ability are the only inputs of human capital production (cf.
figure 2): Over her life-cycle, an individual spends her time on education up to
date e. Then, she works with exogenously given intensity until retirement at date
R.
We assume that individual ability ι is relatively more important in acquiring
Figure 2
An individual’s activity over the life-cycle. 0 e
Education Work Retirement
R
high-skilled human capital. These characteristics of human capital accumulation
are formalized as
θ1ι = ̟e
1
ι , (2)
θ2ι = ιe
2
ι ι ∈ [0, 1] . (3)
Note that for simplicity, θ1 is independent of ι.7 Individuals maximize their hu-
man capital, i.e. their lifetime earnings. The problem of an individual with abil-
ity ι is therefore to choose the type of human capital sι and the optimal education
time spent on its accumulation esι , given the retirement date Rι and the wage-rate
ws per unit of human wealth, such that
{sι, e
s
ι } = arg max
{s˜ι,e˜ι}∈{1,2}×[0,Rι]
Hsι =
Rι∫
es˜ι
θ s˜ιw
s˜dτ.
7In the simulated model, ability does not enter the human capital production function, but is a de-
terminant of the cost of acquiring a certain skill level. This leads to a clear stratification of ability types
in both formulations. In order to keep this illustrative example simple, we abstain from introducing
type-dependent costs of education – apart from the opportunity costs of time. This is similarly done,
e.g. in Cervellati and Sunde (2005) and Razin and Sadka (2001).
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The benefit of a longer education period is an increase in productivity during the
working period. The cost consists of a shorter work life. For any individual of
ability ι there is a unique time investment, which maximizes lifetime earnings
from any type of human capital,
e1ι = argmax
e˜1ι
(
R− e˜1ι
)
̟ e˜1ι w
1 = e1 =
R
2
, (4)
e2ι = argmax
e˜2ι
(
R− e˜2ι
)
ιe˜2ι w
2 = e2 =
R
2
. (5)
Since ability enters both benefit and cost symmetrically, there are no differences
in education among individuals of different ability. The resulting skill levels are
therefore, by (2) and (3),
θ1ι = θ
1 = ̟
R
2
,
θ2ι = ι
R
2
.
Hence, optimum skill acquisition is proportional to the expected length of the
working period, and only θ2ι depends on the ability of the individuals in that
skill group.
4.3 Extensive Education Decision
The type of human capital an individual chooses to acquire – measured as the
sum over all lifetime earnings – results from a comparison of the respective levels
of human wealth
H1 =
R∫
e1
θ1w1dτ =
(
R
2
)2
̟w1, (6)
H2ι =
R∫
e2
θ2ι w
2dτ =
(
R
2
)2
ιw2. (7)
Individuals with higher ability have a comparative advantage in the acquiring of
skills, and the human capital of those investing in skills increases monotonically
in the ability parameter, cf. figure 3.
9
Figure 3Discrete choice between two skill groups. 0
H2
H1
1unskilled skilledι˜
An individual is indifferent between acquiring low-skilled and high-skilled hu-
man capital iff
H1 = H2ι˜ .
Hence, using (6) and (7), the pivotal (indifferent) worker type ι˜ is determined by
ι˜ = ̟
w1
w2
. (8)
The relative size of the two skill classes is determined by the relative wage, which
itself by (1) depends on the skill structure in the economy. The total number of
efficiency units in each skill class is given by the employment duration, R− es,
times the number of workers times their human capital. Assuming skills to be
distributed uniformly over the unit interval, ι ∼ U (0, 1) , and normalizing the
total number of workers to unity, the number of low skilled workers is equal to
N1 = ι˜. The number of high skilled workers is accordingly N2 = 1− ι˜. The size
of the two labor forces in efficiency units is then given by
L1 =
(
R− e1
)
N1θ1 =
(
R
2
)2
ι˜̟, (9)
L2 =
(
R− e2
) 1∫
ι˜
θ2ι dι =
(
R
2
)2 (1
2
−
1
2
ι˜2
)
. (10)
Relating (9) to (6), we see that the total wage bill for unskilled labor, w1L1 just
equals total human capital H1N1. Substituting (8) for ι˜, we get
L2
L1
=
1
2̟
(
1
ι˜
− ι˜
)
=
1
2
(
1
̟2
w2
w1
−
w1
w2
)
.
This yields the increasing relative labor supply curve in figure 4 below.
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4.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by a stratification of individuals according to
(11), which determines the relative size of the two skill classes, wages and in-
tensive education levels. Inserting (1) and (9)/(10) into (8), we implicitly get the
equilibrium pivotal worker type
ι˜ = ̟
ϑ
1− ϑ
(
R
2
)2 (
1
2 −
1
2 ι˜
2
)
K +
(
R
2
)2
ι˜̟
(11)
as a function of the relative importance of the two labor types in production ϑ, the
level of the capital stock K, the retirement date R, and the relative productivity of
time in educational production ̟.
Since the demand for labor is – by the capital-skill complementarity – tightly
linked to the capital stock, we first analyze the equilibrium reaction of education
to changes in capital. The responses of intensive and extensive education to an
increase in the capital stock are
de1
dK
=
de2
dK
= 0,
dι˜
dK
= −
1
K
ι˜ + ̟
(
R
2
)2
2−ϑ
1−ϑ
< 0.
Educational effort at the intensive margin is not influenced by a change in the
capital stock since the costs of education consist only of foregone earnings and
a change in marginal productivity affects both costs and benefits equally. Figure
4 displays the effect of a decrease in the capital stock at the extensive margin.
As long as the relative supply of low and high skilled labor is unchanged, by
the complementarity of capital and skilled labor, the relative demand for skilled
labor shifts to the left, moving the equilibrium from point (a) to (b). The resulting
decrease in the skill premium induces less workers to acquire skills, which shifts
the relative supply for skilled labor to the left, leading to the final equilibrium in
point (c).
An increase in the retirement age affects education both at the intensive and the
extensive margin. We find that in equilibrium the comparative static effects of
11
Figure 4
Dynamic effects of capital-skill
complementarity.
relative supply
relative demand
c
b
a
w2
w1
L2
L1
postponed retirement on extensive and intensive education are
de1
dR
=
de2
dR
=
1
2
> 0,
dι˜
dR
=
ϑ
1−ϑ
R
2 − ι˜
2 2−ϑ
1−ϑ
R
2
2K
̟ + 2ι
2−ϑ
1−ϑ
(
R
2
)2 ⋚ 0,
⇔ ι˜ R
√
ϑ
2− ϑ
.
Educational effort is increased by a prolongation of the redemption period. At
the extensive margin, education increases as long as the relative size of the high
skilled workforce is below a certain threshold, which is determined by the rel-
ative importance of capital and low skilled labor and high skilled labor in the
production process: With a high importance of skilled labor, postponed retire-
ment will likely increase its share.
Relative supply remains unchanged initially, as both labor forces grow in paral-
lel. According to (1), relative demand shifts to the left, moving the equilibrium
from (a) to (b) in figure 5. Again, the resulting decrease in the skill premium in-
duces less workers to acquire skills, which shifts the relative supply for skilled
labor to the left. Considering (9) and (10), the size of this shift depends on the
initial relative sizes of the two workforces. The shift in relative supply leads to
the final equilibrium in point (c). Depending on the parameter constellation, the
relative wage has risen or fallen in the new stationary equilibrium.
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Figure 5
Dynamic effects of postponed retirement.
relative supply
relative demand
c
b
a
w2
w1
L2
L1
5 Calibration
Our simulations are based on the model developed by Jaag, Keuschnigg, and
Keuschnigg (2005), incorporating probabilistic aging and frictional labor mar-
kets.8 We calibrate the model to stylized data of Switzerland in 2000. Table 5.1
states key parameters characterizing preferences and technology. The choice of
the most important parameters is detailed in the following sections by referring
to the relevant literature.
Studies on the depreciation rate of human capital range between 1% and 12% (cf.
Heckman, 1976, Haley, 1976, Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2005, and the review
by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999). In the applied literature, very low
values are used: Zero by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and 0.025 by Per-
roni (1995). We employ a value of 0.05. Following the literature, we calibrate the
depreciation rate of physical capital to 0.1.
5.1 Mortality and Transition Probabilities
Individual aging occurs not deterministically (cf. appendix 8.1): In every period,
there is a probability of aging ωa. There is also an age-group specific mortality
probability 1− γa. Let Na denote the number of individuals in age group a. A
tilde indicates the decomposition in annual cohorts, such that Na ≡ N˜t. For
simplicity, we consider a demographic stationary state and ignore time indices
in this section. We further assume that aging parameters are equal across skill
8The feature of frictional labor markets is not explicitly exploited in our simulations, however.
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Table 5.1
Taste and technology parameter calibration.
Real interest rate R 1.050
Capital depreciation rate δK 0.100
Skill depreciation rate δS 0.050
Subjective discount factor β 0.997
Cost share of goods invested in education ς 0.250
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ 0.500
Semi-elasticity of discrete skill choice εd 0.100
Training elasticity with respect to training returns εe 0.300
Labor supply elasticity εl 0.400
Capital – low skill elasticity of substitution σK,L
1
1.600
Capital – medium skill elasticity of substitution σK,L
2
1.000
Capital – high skill elasticity of substitution σK,L
3
0.600
Social security contribution τW 0.080
Notes: The training and labor supply elasticities are εi ≡ ϕ′i/(iϕ
′′
i ) for
i ∈ {e, l}, where ϕ is a cost function, cf. (20). Technology as in (25),
social security contributions are relative to gross wage income, such
that τWwat l
a
t θ˜
a
t = −z
aW
t , where w
a
t l
a
t θ˜
a
t is average gross wage income.
groups. Setting ωa = 0 implies that an aging event occurs with probability one
in each period, leading to N˜t = γ˜t−1N˜t−1. The concept of an age group thus
becomes identical with a cohort, where age t is measured by time since birth.
Taking age-dependent survival rates γ˜t from official mortality tables, the cohort
composition of the population in a demographic steady state can be constructed.
Recursively applying N˜t = γ˜t−1N˜t−1 yields the size of cohort t relative to the size
of a new cohort. Summing up over all cohorts fixes the size of the new cohort
compared to total population size N,
N˜t = N˜1
t−1
∏
s=1
γ˜s, N˜1 = N
/
T
∑
t=1
t−1
∏
s=1
γ˜s .
Taking a total length of life of T years, and based on actual survival rates, we
have thus found the stationary decomposition of the population into a total of
T cohorts. Using the population decomposition indicated in table 5.2, each age
groups contains several cohorts,
Na =
αa+1
∑
t=αa
N˜t.
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Given that the instantaneous probability of staying in the current age-group is
ωaγa, the expected duration in group a is
αa+1− αa = 1/ (1−ω
aγa) ,
where αa denotes the time when age-group a is entered. The chosen age group
decomposition of the actual population corresponds to a life-cycle history where
an agent spends exactly the average duration in each age period. One can thus
recover the demographic parameters of the model from our knowledge of ag-
gregated population data Na and duration in group a. In a demographic steady
state, each age group must fulfill the restriction
(1− γaωa) · Na =
(
γa−1− γa−1ωa−1
)
· Na−1. (12)
At this stage, one knows Na from aggregated population data and γaωa from the
age group duration as implied by the chosen aggregation. The only unknown in
(12) is γa−1, which is easily solved for all groups except the last one. For the last
group, γA follows directly from (12) on account of the restriction ωA = 1. For all
age groups a < A, γa can now be recovered recursively.
Individuals enter our model at age 20. We exclude ages 0− 20 from the analysis
for two reasons: First, in our model setting, the extensive schooling decision as
described in section 8.3 in the appendix is considered to make up the initial con-
dition for on-the-job training, and second, the actual survival function cannot be
easily approximated as the mortality hazard is non-monotonous.
Table 5.2 shows our decomposition of the population from ages 20 to 90. The ag-
ing pattern corresponds to a life-cycle biography α = (20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 85) ,
which serves as an aggregation key. It allows for a statement about the size and
law of motion of the various age groups. The parameters γa and ωa and the in-
flow into age-group 1, N1t+1,t+1, are chosen such that the stationary solution to
(16)-(19) in the appendix corresponds to line 3 in table 5.2.
5.2 Intertemporal Substitution
In the literature, much effort has been devoted to accurately pin down the value
of the rate of intertemporal substitution. On the one hand, macroeconomists use
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Table 5.2
Demographic and life-cycle parameters.
Age groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cohorts 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-84 85-89
Data Na/N 0.168 0.222 0.192 0.168 0.120 0.089 0.025 0.016
Model Na/N 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.107 0.031 0.016
Labor prod. θ˜1,a 1.000 1.189 1.237 1.121 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.000
Labor prod. θ˜2,a 1.299 1.490 1.641 1.705 1.609 0.000 0.000 0.000
Labor prod. θ˜3,a 1.431 2.388 2.663 2.921 2.462 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob. 1− γa 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.042 0.096 0.200
Prob. 1− ωa 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.089 0.074 0.061 0.115 0.000
Factor Ωa 1.026 1.036 1.046 1.053 1.056 1.085 1.102 1.000
Propens. 1/∆a 0.039 0.044 0.051 0.062 0.078 0.104 0.161 0.220
Notes: θ˜s,a is average productivity, 1− γa probability of dying, 1−ωa probability of aging, Ωa
magnification factor reflecting increase in mortality, 1/∆a marginal propensity to consume.
Data sources: BFS (2001, 2004) and own calculations.
a large value in general, reflecting a common view that a high degree of intertem-
poral substitution is more consistent with aggregate data considering dynamic
macroeconomic models. In their seminal paper, Kydland and Prescott (1982) cal-
ibrate it to 0.66, and Lucas (1990) argues that an elasticity of 0.5 appears too low
when confronted with macro data. Laitner and Silverman (2005) estimate it to be
as high as 0.87. Also, Weil (1989) finds that in order match growth and business
cycle facts the intertemporal rate of substitution is required to be close to unity.
In an influential paper Hall (1988) shows that consumption growth is completely
insensitive to changes in interest rates and, therefore, intertemporal elasticity is
close to zero. Guvenen (2003) argues that this apparent contradiction arises from
ignoring heterogeneity across individuals with respect to stock market participa-
tion and wealth. The properties of aggregate variables directly linked to wealth,
such as investment and output are entirely determined by high-elasticity stock-
holders, while aggregate consumption, which is more evenly distributed across
households, uncovers the low-elasticity of most households. In accordance with
the literature on life-cycle modeling, we calibrate the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution to 0.5 and check for robustness with values of 0.3 and 0.7.
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5.3 Skill Structure and Labor Market
In order to account for the established difference between labor of various skill
levels in their substitutability with capital, we use a nested CES production func-
tion commonly used in the relevant empirical literature; specific to our setting
is the inclusion of more than two skill classes. Every differentiated input factor
in the production function makes up for an input level in the nesting structure,
as shown in figure 12 below. We concentrate on the analysis of three differenti-
ated skill classes, which is a realistic reproduction of the education structure in
Switzerland .
With the skill choice given by (24) in the appendix, the cost parameter ξs of ex-
tensive education is calibrated using
ξs =
∆Vs
exp
(
Γ(vs)
εD
) ,
where Γ (vs) can be recovered from the skill distribution of the 20 years old in the
population. As to the extensive skill choice, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998)
find that an increase in college tuition of $1000 (or – equivalently – a decrease
in the present value of after-tax earnings) decreases the probability of attend-
ing college by about 0.08. This estimate is slightly higher than the estimate by
Kane (1994) who finds an according decrease by 0.05 (cf. also Dupor, Lochner,
Taber, and Wittekind, 1996). There is no clear direct empirical evidence on the
effect of wage differentials on the extensive education decision. Topel (1999),
Card and Lemieux (2000), and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) suggest
that teenagers use information on the wage gaps between different attainment
levels to evaluate the size of their own future returns to schooling. Since there
are many more factors influencing high school and university attendance, such
as credit constraints and uncertainty about future earnings, we use a value of 0.1
for the semi-elasticity of the extensive skill choice with respect to differences in
indirect utility.
Figure 5.6
Skill distribution in the Swiss
population, 2000.
Source: BFS (2004)
Skill class ISCED Size Inc. share
1 1/2 19% 12%
2 3/4 54% 50%
3 5/6 27% 38%
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The three skill classes refer to individuals whose highest level of education is sec-
ondary I, secondary II and tertiary, respectively. Figure 5.6 shows the according
ISCED9 levels of our skill classes along with their relative population- and labor
income shares. The skill class and age group specific productivity parameter θ
is calibrated using wage data from Switzerland, 2000. The shapes of individual
wage profiles are displayed in figure 7.
The income share of capital is chosen to be 0.35 (cf. I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu,
Figure 7
Wageprofiles of high, medium, and low
skilled workers.
Source: BFS (2004), own computations
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and Joines, 1995, and Conesa and Krueger, 1999, who choose 0.36). The empirical
evidence on the static labor supply elasticity is reviewed by Hansson and Stuart
(1985) and Blundell andMaCurdy (1999). The latest, most advanced studies yield
estimates of the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply between 0.05 and
0.12 for men and 0.3 and 1 for women. We calibrate the labor supply elasticity to
0.4.
Following Lord (1989) and Trostel (1993) we specify the intensive human capital
production function to be
F (e, I) = F0 I
ςe1−ς.
In order to keep the model tractable and differing from the literature, current
skills do not enter human capital production, such that investment in skills has
no compounding effect, cf. (22). The private cost shares of time and goods in-
vested in education are about 75% and 25% (Becker, 1993). We therefore specify
ς = 0.25.
9 ISCED is the International Standard Classification of Education.
18
5.4 Production Technology
For general production functions with more than two inputs, there are multiple
possible definitions for the elasticity of substitution between pairs of input. The
one most commonly used is the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution
which measures the percentage change in the ratio of two inputs in response to
a change in the ratio of the two input prices, holding all other prices – but not
all other inputs – and the output quantity constant. This measure is widely used
in the empirical literature, e.g. by Sato (1967), Griliches (1969), and Goldin and
Katz (1998). The Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution is
σi,j ≡
C1 (w)C1i,j (w)
C1i (w)C
1
j (w)
where C1 denotes total cost of final output and subscripts refer to partial deriva-
tives with respect to inputs i and j.10 w is the vector of unit prices of the input
factors in q =
{
L1, L2, L3,K
}
. Denote by k the deepest aggregate containing both
inputs i and j. In the production function (25) with the nest at level 1 producing
final output, the elasticities of substitution between any two input factors i and j
write as
σi,j = σ1 + C1
k
∑
n=2
(
σn − σn−1
)
Cn
(13)
where Cl is the total cost of a nest at level l and σl = 1
1−κl
. Note that the elastic-
ity of substitution between i and j is independent of the subnest elasticity in all
nests s > k. Applying the concept of capital-skill complementarity implies in the
setting of our production technology that
σK,L
i
< σK,L
j
⇔ i > j.11
10Another measure is the Hicks-Allen direct partial elasticity of substitution which measures the per-
centage change in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two input prices,
holding all other prices, inputs, and the output quantity constant. Assume a general production tech-
nology Y = F(q). Letting Fi ≡ ∂F/∂q
i , the direct partial elasiticty of substitution between the ith and the
jth element in q is given by σd,i,j = −∂ ln
(
qi/qj
) /
∂ ln
(
Fi/Fj
)
, where Y and all qk/∈{i,j} are held constant.
11Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004) show that in the two-level CES specification of (25)
with L1 denoting high-skilled labor and L2 low-skilled labor, the capital-skill complementarity holds
iff σ1 < σ2, regardless of which elasticity measure is used. We are well aware that the Allen-Uzawa
elasticity as a measure of substitutability lacks the salient theoretical properties the Hicksian elasticity of
substitution exhibits in the two-goods case (cf. Blackorby and Russell, 1989). Since most of the empirical
literature deals with that measure, however, we also stick to it.
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The relative income shares of the three kinds of labor and capital are known from
data. The elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled / unskilled labor
is taken from the empirical literature. Using three types of labor, it is clear that
high skilled labor is even more complementary with capital than skilled labor
in the literature dealing with two kinds of labor only. Hence, we correct the re-
spective elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled / unskilled labor
accordingly. The values of σ1, σ2, σ3 are computed from (13) recursively:
σ1 = σK,H
1
,
σ2 =
C2
C1
(
σK,H
2
− σ1
)
+ σ1,
σ3 =
C3
C1
(
σK,H
3
− σ1 −
C1
C2
(
σ2 − σ1
))
+ σ2.
Using κs ≡ 1−
1
σs we get κ1 = 0.375, κ2 = 0.045, κ3 = −0.238 (cf. figure 12).
Fromnational accounting we know the income shares of the different production
factors. Taking these into account, we can calibrate the distribution coefficients
a1 = 0.163, a2 = 0.365, a3 = 0.288.
Using a nested CES production technology with two kinds of labor, Krusell, Oha-
nian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) estimate the elasticity of substitution be-
tween unskilled labor and capital to be 1.67. This is close to the value of 1.5
reported by Johnson (1997). Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004)
report a range from 1.3 to 10 for this value. Similarly, the estimate by Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) of the elasticity of substitution between
skilled labor and capital is 0.67, which is in the range of the estimations by
Hamermesh (1993). The estimates by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante
(2000) are also used in Lindquist (2004). There are no estimates for three types of
labor up to date. In order to account for a third skill class, we set the elasticity
of substitution between capital and low, medium, and high skill labor to 1.5, 1.0,
and 0.6, respectively.
6 Simulation Scenarios
We start our simulations with a pure aging scenario, which consists of people
becoming older on average and potentially living longer. In a second step, we
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compare the aging scenario with a scenario, where retirement is postponed ac-
cordingly by exogenous imposition, which potentially offsets the adverse eco-
nomic consequences of aging. Similar scenarios have been considered by Miles
(1999), Echevarrı´a (2004), and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005).
Becoming older in our model means that the mass of people in their 80s becomes
larger because more of the younger agents make it to their 80s. Living longer
means that the life-time horizon gets longer. To implement the scenario, we raise
the survival rates of age groups 5 to 8 by the factors given in table 5.3 but keep the
expected duration in each age group constant. The mortality rates 1− γa decline,
which necessarily implies that a larger fraction of this group moves to the next
one, instead of dying. Since the last group becomes less mortal, 1 − γ8 falling
from 0.2 to 0.12, expected duration in that group rises from 5 to
(
1− γ8
)−1
= 8.3
years. The representative agent lives longer, namely 93.3 instead of 90 years. This
corresponds to the aging scenario in Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) who
discuss the implications of longevity in a model with a single mortality rate.
Table 5.3
Aging and life-expectancy.
Age groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial Na 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.107 0.031 0.016
New Na 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.121 0.047 0.058
Factor ×γa 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.020 1.050 1.100
Prob. 1− γa 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.050 0.120
Prob. 1−ωa 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.089 0.083 0.079 0.158 0.000
Notes: 1− γa mortality rate, 1− ωa probability of aging.
In the simulations, we start with a net foreign debt-GDP ratio calibrated to equal
0.25. In a small open economy, the real interest rate is fixed on world markets.
Any imbalance between domestic savings and investment is thus reflected in a
change in the net foreign asset position.12
12In a closed economy, the domestic real interest rate would adjust to keep net foreign assets to zero.
This second scenario would also be interesting, as aging is a worldwide phenomenon that might lead
to a decline in the real interest rate via increased savings. For example, computations by Bo¨rsch-Supan,
Ludwig, and Winter (2004) yield a decline in the return to capital by roughly one percentage point as a
result of worldwide aging.
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6.1 Population Aging
The effects of population aging are summarized in table 5.6 in the appendix.
Even though the interest rate remains constant, the ratio between capital and the
three different kinds of labor varies due to the nested CES-production technol-
ogy described in appendix 8.4. Aging results in a larger number of old people. In
the absence of an offsetting decline in fertility, the mass of younger age groups re-
mains unchanged, leading to a constant workforce. By assumption, the increased
number of retirees increases required PAYG contributions by almost 40%. These
crowd out private savings and aggregate asset holdings by households (-22.5%
in the baseline case), which is reflected in a sharp decrease in net foreign assets.
The projected fall in savings is also found by Miles (1999). Since PAYG contribu-
tions are lump-sum, there is no direct effect on wages and labor supply; GDP and
the capital stock remain virtually unchanged. The slight increase in the capital
stock induces a rise of wage differentials. The decrease in the utility differences
between skill classes, which leads to a fall in educational attainment, is due to
the increase in total pension benefits, which is relatively more important for un-
skilled labor. The resulting decrease of the high-skilled workforce increases the
wage of skilled labor, which leads to an increase in individual labor supply of
skilled workers. Human wealth, consisting of human capital and social secu-
rity wealth, increases in all skill classes; the increase in total pension entitlements
benefits low-skilledworkersmost, however, because the proportional increase in
PAYG contributions affects them least relative to their total wealth.
6.2 Population Aging and Postponed Retirement
In the second simulation, we consider an increase in the retirement age by two
years. The third simulation will then merge the two first scenarios in order to
evaluate the combined effect of aging and pension reform. For simplicity, we
impose the postponement of retirement exogenously.
A two-year postponement of retirement increases the workforce by 3.6% while
reducing the number of retirees by 16.1% (cf. table 5.7 in the appendix). Keeping
per-capita pension benefits constant, this results in a decrease in necessary PAYG
contributions by 18.2%. Postponed retirement reduces the need for individual
pension savings, so that asset holdings decrease by 8.2% in the baseline case.
Postponed retirement prolongs the redemption period of investments in human
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capital, such that the utility difference between skilled and unskilled workers
increases and educational attainment rises. Also, education at the intensive mar-
gin rises due to a longer redemption period of human capital investments. This
is reflected in increased levels of human wealth. These results are perfectly in
line with the comparative static effects found in section 4.4 in the context of the
illustrative model. In a similar experiment, Trostel (1993) finds that the level of
the income tax rate decisively affects human capital accumulation.13 However,
his quantitative results are not directly comparable to ours, since an increase in
the income tax rate affects both the costs and benefits of investment in human
capital, while in our setting, postponed retirement only affects the benefit side of
the education decision.
The third simulation considers a scenario on top of population aging with poten-
tially less severe economic consequences due to the postponement of retirement
(cf. table 5.8 in the appendix).14 Part of the overall population increase accrues
now to workers. Therefore, PAYG payments increase only by 20.2%, compared
to 40% in the case of constant retirement. Also, the adverse skill choice effects
are somewhat mitigated. However, since postponed retirement reduces the time
individuals stay in retirement, there is less need for individual savings to aug-
ment consumption possibilities at later ages. Therefore, the decrease in asset
holdings due to aging is even aggravated. This effect is a result, however, of the
low level of PAYG payments. Higher benefit levels would lessen the need for pri-
vate savings and therefore dampen the adverse effect of postponed retirement
on asset holdings. The disproportionate increase of low skilled individuals’ hu-
man wealth lowers educational attainment and thereby the capital stock via the
complementarity between capital and high skilled labor, as discussed in section
4. Together, they depress GDP by 2.3% in the baseline simulation. Hence, con-
sidering individual saving effects and allowing for capital-skill complementarity
in production results in postponed retirement not being appropriate to mitigate
adverse economic effects of population aging.
Figure 8 displays the discrete skill choice over time. The solid line depicts the
choice for high skilled labor relative to the initial steady state. The dashed and
dotted lines showmediumand low skilled labor, respectively.Reducedutility dif-
13In his simulation, a one percent increase in the income tax rate causes human capital to decline by
0.39 percent.
14In fact, based on welfare considerations, Andersen (2005) argues that retirement age should be pro-
portional to expected life length, just as edcuation with respect to the length of the working period in
(4) and (5) in our simple illustrative model.
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Figure 8Discrete skill choice over time.
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ferences between different skill classes sharply decrease educational attainment.
In the long run, wages adjust, and attainment returns towards its initial level.
This is exactly the effect in shown in 4 in the context of the stylized model. The
relative size of the three skill groups evolves according to the inflows of individ-
uals into these groups, as displayed in figure 9. Again, the solid line depicts high
skilled labor relative to the initial steady state. The dashed and dotted lines show
medium and low skilled labor, respectively.
Figure 9The size of the three skill classes.
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The key model parameters are the elasticity of substitution between capital and
the three different kinds of labor as well as the education choice parameters at the
extensive and intensive margin. We check the robustness of our results and the
importance of the educational decision margins by varying the values of these
parameters. Table 5.4 displays the sensitivity of the effect of aging and post-
poned retirement on aggregate human wealth. Overall, human wealth increases
due to the prolongation of the redemption period, which yields investments in
human capital more profitable at any stage of the life-cycle.
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Table 5.4
Sensitivity of human wealth to education parameters.
εe = 0.10 εe = 0.30 εe = 0.50 εe = 0.70 εe = 0.90
εd = 0.05 19.813 26.204 33.766 42.877 54.123
εd = 0.10 19.320 25.644 33.148 42.216 53.438
εd = 0.15 19.028 25.315 32.787 41.832 53.043
εd = 0.20 18.834 25.098 32.550 41.580 52.784
εd = 0.25 18.695 24.943 32.381 41.401 52.601
As economic intuition suggests, total human wealth reacts the more, the higher
the training elasticity with respect to training returns εe. However, its responsive-
ness decreases in the semi-elasticity of the discrete skill choice decision. This this
is due to the negative reaction of educational attainment to aging and postponed
retirement, which partly offsets the positive effect on intensive human capital
formation.
Table 5.5 shows the sensitivity of human wealth to the elasticities of substitu-
tion between capital and low-skilled labor, σK,L1 , and between capital and high-
skilled labor, σK,L3 , which determine the degree of complementarity between
capital and skill. The larger the difference σK,L1 − σK,L3 , the larger is the com-
plementarity. In the first column, all elasticities of substitution between capital
and labor are equal to unity, as e.g. with a Cobb-Douglas production technol-
ogy. As in table 5.4, an increase in the skill choice semi-elasticity reduces the
response of human wealth to aging and postponed retirement due to lower at-
tainment. An increase in capital-skill complementarity affects the response of
human wealth to aging and postponed retirement only to the degree that indi-
viduals actually adapt their skill choice to labor market conditions, i.e. with εd
close to zero, capital-skill complementarity is of little economic importance.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the importance of education and human capital forma-
tion in a macroeconomic context. We apply the concept of probabilistic aging
with endogenous discrete skill choice to analyze the economic impact of aging
during demographic transition. The model setting allows for an appraisal of
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Table 5.5
Sensitivity of human wealth to capital-skill complementarity.
σK,L
1
= 1.0 σK,L
1
= 1.5 σK,L
1
= 2.0 σK,L
1
= 2.5 σK,L
1
= 3.0
σK,L
3
= 1.0 σK,L
3
= 0.8 σK,L
3
= 0.6 σK,L
3
= 0.4 σK,L
3
= 0.2
εd = 0.01 27.063 27.064 27.064 27.064 27.064
εd = 0.05 26.229 26.204 26.182 26.163 26.145
εd = 0.10 25.705 25.648 25.594 25.547 25.500
εd = 0.50 24.730 24.571 24.414 24.265 24.110
εd = 0.90 24.543 24.357 24.171 23.993 23.805
Notes: σK,L
2
= 1.0, εe = 0.3.
inter- and intragenerational distribution effects by considering eight age groups
and three skill classes with endogenous human capital accumulation at the ex-
tensive and intensive margin. The empirically well established complementarity
between capital and skilled labor is embraced in a nested CES production tech-
nology. Simulating the effect of aging on key macro variables, we find that the
remunerations of labor in different skill classes and accordingly their size are
very differently affected. In a small open economy, where the interest rate is tied
to international capital markets, GDP contracts due to decreased labor supply as a
result of lower net wages and the adverse effect on educational attainment. Post-
poned retirement solves this problem partially by prolonging the redemption
period of investments in human capital and thereby inducing higher extensive
and intensive education. However, it introduces a new one: decreased private
savings due to a lower need for funded old-age benefits.
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8 Appendix
This first appendix outlines the concept of probabilistic aging as in Grafenhofer,
Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005), which allows for the possibility that
an individual keeps her individual characteristics, such as age and productivity
in the next time-period, but also that she may be struck by sudden death. In the
second appendix, we describe individual life-cycle optimization with respect to
labor supply and intensive education. The third appendix contains a discussion
of the extensive education decision. In the fourth appendix, we present the pro-
duction part of the model with capital-skill complementarity in the production
technology. The fifth appendix contains the simulation results in table form.
8.1 Probabilistic Aging
In order to reproduce realistic wage profiles, individuals must undergo some
kind of aging. To preserve aggregability, aging is absent in Blanchard-style mod-
els of “perpetual youth” with overlapping generations. Since we are interested
in modeling life-cycle wage-profiles in the context of an OLG model of the Blan-
chard style, while still being able to find closed-form aggregate solutions, we use
the concept of probabilistic aging to model aging as shown in figure 10. In this
section, we concentrate on individual decisions once their skill level s is deter-
mined and fixed. We therefore temporarily drop superscript s. Each individual
is a member of one of A age- or productivity-groups a ∈ {1, . . . , A}. Individuals
are born in age group a = 1 as workers. The affiliation of a variable at time t to
an individual currently belonging to age-group a is denoted by (·)at .
To model demographics, we allow for mortality among all age groups. When an
individual with an arbitrarily given life-cycle history plans for next period, she
faces the risk of aging and dying (cf. figure 10). She must thus reckon with three
possible events: (i) she dies with probability 1 − γa; (ii) she survives without
aging and remains in the same age group with probability γaωa, and (iii) she
survives and ages and belongs to age group a + 1 next period with probability
γa (1−ωa). Individuals in the last age group have exhausted the aging process
and remain in this group with probability one, ωA = 1. They may either survive
with probability γA within group A or diewith probability 1−γA. In this setting,
time passes faster than age, i.e. individuals normally stay in the same age-group
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for several periods. The last age group behaves according to the mortality and
demographic assumptions of Blanchard’s (1985) perpetual youth model.
Figure 10
Aging and mortality hazard of
individuals in the model
γ1ω1 γ2ω2 γA
1 2 A
γ1
(
1 − ω1
)
1 − γ1 1 − γ2 1 − γA
† † †
The number of agents at date t, in state of life a and with aging history ff is given
by Naff,t. Within this group, agents are identical up to their skill level and asset
holdings and face the same independent probability of moving to one of the al-
ternative states. With stochastically independent risks, the law of large numbers
implies that the above stated individual probabilities correspond to the fraction
of people that are subject to the respective event. Consequently, the group is di-
vided into three subgroups next period: (i) those who die, (ii) those who survive
within the same age group a, and (iii) those who are hit by an aging event, switch
to the next higher age group. The age group and the biography ff remains un-
changed in case (ii) while switching to the next higher age group a + 1 in case
(iii) adds another event in a person’s life-cycle history ff and thereby results in a
new biography ff′:
(i) N†
ff†,t+1 = N
a
ff,t · (1− γ
a) , death,
(ii) Naff,t+1 = N
a
ff,t · γ
aωa, no aging,
(iii) Na+1ff′,t+1 = N
a
ff,t · γ
a (1−ωa) , aging.
(14)
Since the characteristics of people such as their earnings potential differ across
age groups, an agent’s consumption, assets and other economic variables will
generally depend on her particular life-cycle history. For example, assets depend
on the agent’s past earnings history which, in turn, is linked to her aging trajec-
tory. To keep track of the population’s heterogeneity, one must thus identify each
agent by her age group as well as her aging biography ff which also includes the
date of birth. An agent’s life-cycle history is her biography of aging events that
have happened since birth. At date t, the set of possible histories of a household
that belongs to age group a is
ℵat ≡ {(α1, . . . , αa) : α1 < . . . < αa ≤ t} . (15)
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A particular life-cycle history is represented by a vector ff ∈ ℵat . The element αi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , a}, denotes the date at which the household who was formerly in age
group i− 1 became a member of group i. In denoting the unborn by a virtual age
group zero, the element α1 lists the date of birth when an agent switches from
the group of the unborn to the first age group. We say that a member of group
a = 1 aged only once with no further aging since birth. Nevertheless, different
persons of the first age group are heterogeneous since they were born at different
moments in the past. The set of possible biographies is then ℵ1t = {(α1) : t ≥ α1}.
With this notation, the vectors α describing the biography of people in group a
have a elements since such persons have aged a times in total.
The individual biographies are updated when a person is subject to an aging
event. Suppose a person is in age group a − 1 and is identified by a given bi-
ography ff = (α1, . . . , αa−1). When the next aging event occurs in period t, she
arrives in group a next period. Her biography is appended by the entry t+ 1 and
will thus read (α1, . . . , αa−1, t+ 1). Accordingly, the set ℵ
a
t of biographies of age
group awill be augmented next period by all the biographies ff′ ∈ ℵa−1t × (t+ 1)
that have t + 1 as their last entry and refer to people who currently switch from
group a− 1 to a. Hence,
ℵat+1 = ℵ
a
t ∪ ℵ
a−1
t × (t + 1) , a ∈ {1, . . . , A} .
Result 1 With the number of individuals in age group a given by
Nat ≡ ∑
ff∈ℵat
Naff,t, (16)
(a) the aggregate law of motion for age group 1 < a ≤ A is
Nat+1 = γ
aωa · Nat + γ
a−1
(
1−ωa−1
)
· Na−1t , ω
A = 1, (17)
(b) age group 1 evolves according to
N1t+1 = γ
1ω1 · N1t + N
1
(t+1),t+1, (18)
(c) total population grows by
Nt+1 = Nt + N
1
(t+1),t+1 −
A
∑
a=1
(1− γa) Nat , Nt ≡
A
∑
a=1
Nat . (19)
Proof. Cf. Grafenhofer, Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005).
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8.2 Life-Cycle Optimization
In different stages of the life-cycle, the individuals’ choice set varies, such that
intertemporal optimization differs across age-groups. As a representative case,
we sketch the problem of individuals belonging to the last working age-group.
The analogous problem of other age-groups is detailed in Jaag, Keuschnigg, and
Keuschnigg (2005).
Individuals are working with probability πt and retired with probability 1− πt.
Workers use time for post-school training e and hours worked l, giving rise to
effort costs ϕe and ϕl for education and work, respectively, multiplied by skill θ.
State variables are assets A and skills θ. Preferences are assumed additively sep-
arable in consumption C and job related efforts. The per-capita Bellman equation
for maximizing expected life-time utility is15
V
(
Aaff,t, θ
a
ff,t
)
= max
Q,ζ,e,,l
[(
Qaff,t
)ρ
+ γaβ
(
GV¯aff,t+1
)ρ]1/ρ
, (20)
Qaff,t = C
a
ff,t− πtϕl (l
a
t ) θ
a
ff,t− πtϕe (e
a
t ) ,
V¯aff,t+1 ≡ ω
aVaff,t+1 + (1−ω
a)Va+1ff′,t+1.
With R denoting the real interest factor and G an exogenous growth rate, workers
accumulate assets and skills according to
γaGAaff,t+1 = Rt+1
[
Aaff,t + πt
(
yaff,t + z
aW
t
)
+ (1− πt) z
aR
t −Q
a
ff,t
]
, (21)
Gθaff,t+1 =
(
1− δS
)
θaff,t + F
(
eaff,t, I
a
ff,t
)
, (22)
where zaWt is an exogenous transfer or a lump-sum tax to workers, z
aR
t a transfer
to retirees, δS skill depreciation, and F(·) is the intensive skill production func-
tion, assumed to be linear homogenous. Switching to the next age-group implies
θa+1ff′,t+1 = θ
a
ff,t+1 and A
a+1
ff′,t+1 = A
a
ff,t+1. Net labor income is given by
yaff,t = [w
a
t l
a
t − ϕl (l
a
t )] θ
a
ff,t − ϕe (e
a
t )− It,
where wat is the wage per efficiency or productivity unit per hour, θ
a
ff,t is the
agent’s productivity (skill) resulting from past training, and Iaff,t is physical in-
vestment in training (books, computers, teachers). We assume that this is a gov-
ernment provided rival good, and thus exogenously controlled. It is supplied
15Preferences are represented by a CES utility function as in Farmer (1990) and Weil (1990). This
formulation allows for risk neutrality while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution can be chosen
arbitrarily.
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at the same amount for all per capita, Iaff,t = It, and the cost of it is charged to
private agents, giving rise to private spending It.
It is convenient to define the shadow prices ηaff,t of assets and χ
a
ff,t of skills,
ηaff,t ≡
∂Vaff,t
∂Aaff,t
(
GVaff,t
)ρ−1
, χaff,t ≡
∂Vaff,t
∂θaff,t
(
GVaff,t
)ρ−1
, µaff,t ≡
χaff,t
ηaff,t
χ¯aff,t+1 ≡
[
ωa
∂Vaff,t+1
∂θaff,t+1
+ (1−ωa)
∂Va+1ff′,t+1
∂θa+1ff′,t+1
] (
GV¯aff,t+1
)ρ−1
,
η¯aff,t+1 ≡
[
ωa
∂Vaff,t+1
∂Aaff,t+1
+ (1−ωa)
∂Va+1ff′,t+1
∂Aa+1ff′,t+1
] (
GV¯aff,t+1
)ρ−1
,
µ¯aff,t ≡ ω
aµaff,t+1 + (1−ω
a)
(
∆a+1t+1/∆
a
t+1
) 1−ρ
ρ
µa+1ff,t+1.
The optimality conditions for (20) subject to (21)/(22) are
Qaff,t :
(
Qaff,t
)ρ−1
= βRt+1η¯
a
ff,t+1,
lat : ϕ
′
l (l
a
t ) = w
a
t ,
eat : ϕ
′
e (e
a
t ) = FE
γaχ¯aff,t+1
Rt+1η¯aff,t+1
,
where FE denotes the partial derivatives of F with respect to e. The envelope
theorem yields:
Aaff,t : η
a
ff,t = G
ρ−1βRt+1η¯
a
ff,t+1,
θaff,t : µ
a
ff,t = w
a
t l
a
t − ϕ
a
L,t +
(
1− δS
) γaχ¯aff,t+1
Rt+1η¯
a
ff,t+1
.
Result 2 Consumption Qaα,t and indirect utility V
a
α,t are
(a) Qaff,t = (1/∆
a
t )
(
Aaff,t + H
a
ff,t + S
a
ff,t
)
, σ = 1/ (1− ρ) ,
(b) Vaff,t = (∆
a
t )
1/ρ Qaff,t,
(c) ∆at = 1+ γ
aβσ
(
Ωat+1Rt+1
)σ−1
∆at+1,
(d) Ωat+1 = ω
a + (1−ωa)
(
∆a+1t+1/∆
a
t+1
) 1−ρ
ρ
,
(e) Haff,t = πty
a
ff,t + γ
aGH¯aff,t+1/
(
Ωat+1Rt+1
)
,
yaff,t = [w
a
t l
a
t − ϕl (l
a
t )] θ
a
ff,t − ϕe (e
a
t )− It,
( f ) H¯aff,t+1 = ω
aHaff,t+1 + (1−ω
a)
(
∆a+1t+1/∆
a
t+1
) 1−ρ
ρ
Ha+1ff′,t+1,
(g) Saff,t = z
a
t + γ
aGS¯aff,t+1/
(
Ωat+1Rt+1
)
,
(h) S¯aff,t+1 = ω
aSaff,t+1 + (1−ω
a)
(
∆a+1t+1/∆
a
t+1
) 1−ρ
ρ
Sa+1ff′,t+1.
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Ωat+1 augments the interest rate Rt+1, accounting for the expected finiteness of life, ∆
a
t
is the inverse of the marginal propensity to consume, H is human capital, and S is social
security wealth.
Proof. Cf. Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005), proposition 3.
Physical investment in education I being determined exogenously, there are pri-
vate rents on education yra, which derive from the inframargial effort and the
non-optimal supply of I.
Result 3 Human capital can be written as shadow price times accumulated skills:
Haff,t = µ
a
t θ
a
ff,t + hr
a
t , hr
a
t = yr
a
t +
γaGh¯r
a
t+1
Rt+1Ω
a
t+1
,
where
yrat = F
a
t
γaµ¯at+1
Rt+1Ω
a
t+1
− πtϕ
a
E − δt I,
h¯r
a
t+1 = ω
ahrat+1 + (1−ω
a)
(
∆a+1t+1/∆
a
t+1
) 1−ρ
ρ
hra+1t+1 .
Proof. Cf. Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2005), equation (28).
8.3 Discrete Skill Choice
At the beginning of their life-cycle individuals choose their skill level. For sim-
plicity, we assume this education to be instantaneous with no time being con-
sumed.16 We distinguish several discrete skill classes and introduce an upper
index s ∈ {1, . . . S} to identify these groups (e.g. high, medium and low skilled
in case of three groups). The structure of individual decisions in the preceding
section is identical for all skill classes. Indirect utility of a new agent born at date t
with skill s is Vs,1
(t),t
. This agent necessarily belongs to age group 1 and has history
α1 = t. Let ϕ
s
ν > 0 be the incremental education effort cost that an agent with skill
s needs to spend to obtain skill s+ 1. The discrete skill choice at the beginning of
the life-cycle is
s = arg max
s˜∈{1,...,S}
V s˜,1
(t),t
−
s˜−1
∑
i=1
ϕiν (ν) ,
dϕiν (ν)
dν
> 0. (23)
16Mincer (1991) argues that – opposed to investment in on-the-job-training – almost none of the goods
invested in education are bought with foregone earnings.
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To obtain a determinate education decision, we must assume heterogeneity of
agents with respect to ability, which is inversely related to the index ν ∈ [0, ν¯].
The discrete skill choice is most easily found by starting with the lowest skill
class s = 1 and asking whether it pays to obtain the next higher degree. Fol-
lowing this procedure, an agent with skill s acquires the incremental educa-
tion to obtain degree s + 1 if the following inequality derived from (23) holds:
Vs+1,1
(t),t
> Vs,1
(t),t
+ ϕsν (ν). For high cost, low ability persons, it is eventually not
worthwhile anymore to incur the incremental education cost. Hence, there exists
a critical agent vs who is just indifferent between degrees s and s + 1:
Vs+1,1
(t),t
= Vs,1
(t),t
+ ϕsν (ν) ⇒ ν
s
t . (24)
Since education cost increases in v, agents with lower ability v > vs and higher
cost remain with skill s. Figure 11 illustrates.
Figure 11
Discrete skill choice with three skill classes. 0
V1
V2
V3
ν¯ν1ν2
V1 + c1(ν)V2 + c2(ν)
New agents are distributed by the cumulative distribution function Γ (ν). Of all
N1
(t),t
new agents in period t, a share pst chooses skill group s where 1 gives the
lowest and S the highest skill group:
Ns,1
(t),t
= N1(t),tp
s
t , p
s
t =


1− Γ
(
ν1t
)
s = 1,
Γ
(
νs−1t
)
− Γ (νst ) 1 < s < S,
Γ
(
νSt
)
s = S.
The educational choice is open only to new households while older ones are
locked into their previously chosen skill group. Hence, the law of motion for
the number of individuals in age-group 1 with skill level s is
Ns,1t+1 = γ
1ω1Ns,1t + N
s,1
(t+1),t+1
.
33
Assume a uniformdistribution of the population v ∼ U (0, 1) implies Γ (νs) = νs.
We specify the cost of education to be
cs (ν) = ξs exp (νs/εd) ⇒ ν
s
t = εd
[
ln∆Vs,1
(t),t
− ln ξs
]
.
This specification implies a semi-elasticity εd of the education decision with re-
spect to ∆Vs ≡ Vs+1 − Vs, i.e. dνs = εd ·
(
d∆Vs,1/∆Vs,1
)
. When life-time utility
of skill s+ 1 increases relative to s, the critical value νs increases and the share of
skill group s in the new cohort declines by dνs.
8.4 Capital-Skill-Complementarity in Production
In our model, we allow for differentiated labor in the production function. As
opposed to Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), Blundell and Bond (2000) and
Blundell, Dias, and Meghir (2003), we explicitly allow for capital-skill comple-
mentarity and hence for a non-constant share of capital in production. There are
several ways of nesting the differentiated production factors within a CES func-
tion, of which six allow for full capital-skill complementarity. With amonotonous
ordering of labor inputs according to their skill level, there are two nestings:
Y = Υ1
(
L1,Υ2
(
L2,Υ3
(
L3,K
)))
,
Y′ = Υ1
(
L3,Υ2
(
L2,Υ3
(
L1,K
)))
,
where Υ1,Υ2,Υ3 are CES aggregators. Y
′ implies the elasticity of substitution be-
tween L3 and K to be the same as between L1 and L3 by the symmetry restrictions
of the CES functional form. This is at odds with factor elasticity estimates, which
suggest that the substitution elasticity between skilled labor and unskilled labor
is higher than the substitution elasticity between skilled labor and capital (cf.
Hamermesh, 1993, and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante, 2000). Hence,
we choose Y which does not seem to be at variance with elasticity estimates.
This ordering of the CES nesting also conforms with the functional form chosen
by Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004).
For the simulations, we use a production function with three kinds of labor and
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capital as inputs of the form (cf. figure 12)
Y = Υ1
(
L1,Υ2
(
L2,Υ3
(
L3,K
)))
(25)
= Y0

a1 (L1)κ
1
+
(
1− a1
)a2 (L2)κ2 + (1− a2) [a3 (L3)κ3 + (1− a3) (K)κ3]
κ2
κ3


κ1
κ2


1
κ1
.
The most aggregate nest is final output Y which consists of unskilled labor L1
and a quantity Y2 which is the output of the next subnest and itself consists of
medium skilled labor L2 and a composite Y3. This last quantity is a composite
of high skilled labor L3 and capital K. The parameters κ1, κ2, κ3 are related to
substitution elasticities and a1, a2, a3 are distribution parameters. The technology
is thus
Y = Y0
[
a1
(
L1
)κ1
+
(
1− a1
) (
Y2
)κ1]1/κ1
,
Y2 =
[
a2
(
L2
)κ2
+
(
1− a2
) (
Y3
)κ2]1/κ2
,
Y3 =
[
a3
(
L3
)κ3
+
(
1− a3
)
(K)κ
3
]1/κ3
.
Figure 12
Production technology with three-level nested CES
structure.
Y
Y2
Y3
K
L1
L2
L3
σ1
σ2
σ3
Note that only one type of labor enters at each level of nesting. The technology
can be characterized by the price elasticity of demand for the input factors. Let
ws be the unit price of labor of type s and cs the unit cost of output of level s, i.e.
cs = FLs · L
s/Ys + cs+1 · Ys+1/Ys. The cost minimization problem at each level s
is
cs = min
Ls,Ys+1
FLs
Ls
Ys
+ cs+1
Ys+1
Ys
, s.t. 1 =

as ( Ls
Ys
)κs
+ (1− as)
(
Ys+1
Ys
)κs
1/κs
.
35
We get input demands at level s,
Ls =
(
as
cs
FLs
)σs
Ys, Ys+1 =
(
(1− as)
cs
cs+1
)σs
Ys, σs ≡
1
1− κs
.
By forward substitution, total compensated demand for labor on aggregation
level s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Ls, is given by
Ls = Ys (as)σ
s
(
cs
FLs
)σs
= Yt (FLs)
−σs (as)σ
s
(
c1
)σ1 s
∏
n=2
(
1− an−1
)σn−1
(cn)σ
n−σn−1 .
By Shephard’s lemma, the derivative of total cost with respect to wi equals the
demand for input factor i:
∂cs
∂FLi
=
{
0 i < s,
Li
Ys i ≥ s.
Therefore, the compensated own-price elasticity of demand for labor s is
∂Ls
∂FLs
FLs
Ls
= −σs + σ1
∂c1
∂FLs
FLs
c1
+
s
∑
n=2
(
σn − σn−1
) ∂cn
∂FLs
FLs
cn
.
Let k ∈ {i, j} denote the deepest price aggregate which contains both FLi andFLj .
Taking into account the impact of FLi on c
j≤k, the cross price-elasticity is given by
εi,j ≡
∂Li
∂FLj
FLj
Li
= σ1
∂c1
∂FLj
FLj
c1
+
k
∑
n=2
(
σn − σn−1
) ∂cn
∂FLj
FLs
cn
.
In analogy, the cross price-elasticity between labor Ls and capital K is
εL
s,K ≡
∂Ls
∂wK
wK
Ls
= σ1
∂c1
∂wK
wK
c1
+
s
∑
n=2
(
σn − σn−1
) ∂cn
∂wK
wK
cn
,
where wK is the cost per unit of capital.
The key parameters to consider in the calibration of the production side of the
model are the elasticities of substitution between input factors. For production
functions with more than two inputs, there are multiple possible definitions for
the elasticity of substitution between pairs of input. The most commonly used is
the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution which measures the percentage
change in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two
input prices, holding all other prices – but not all other inputs – and the output
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quantity constant. This measure is widely used in the empirical literature, e.g.
by Sato (1967), Griliches (1969), and Goldin and Katz (1998). The Allen-Uzawa
elasticity of substitution is
σi,j ≡ εi,j
c1Y1
FLjq
j
,
where qj is the quantity of input good j.17 Denote by k the deepest aggregate
containing both inputs i and j. In the production function with the nest at level
1 producing final output, the elasticities of substitution between any two input
factors i and j write as
σi,j = σ1 + Y1c1
k
∑
n=2
(
σn − σn−1
)
Yncn
, (26)
where cn is the unit cost of a nest at level n and σn = 11−κn . Note that the elastic-
ity of substitution between i and j is independent of the subnest elasticity in all
nests s > k. Applying the concept of capital-skill complementarity implies in the
setting of our production technology that18
σK,L
i
< σK,L
j
⇔ i > j.
The relative income shares of the three kinds of labor and capital are known
from data. The elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled / unskilled
labor are taken from the empirical literature. Using three types of labor, it is
clear that high skilled labor is evenmore complementarywith capital than skilled
labor in the literature dealing with two kinds of labor only. Hence, we correct
the respective elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled / unskilled
17Another measure is the Hicks-Allen direct partial elasticity of substitution which measures the per-
centage change in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two input prices,
holding all other prices, inputs, and the output quantity constant. Assume a general production tech-
nology Y = F(q). Letting Fi ≡ ∂F/∂q
i , the direct partial elasiticty of substitution between the ith and the
jth element in q is given by σd,i,j = −∂ ln
(
qi/qj
) /
∂ ln
(
Fi/Fj
)
, where Y and all qk/∈{i,j} are held constant.
18Duffy et al. (2004) show that in the two-level CES specification of (25) with L1 denoting low-skilled
labor and L2 high-skilled labor, the capital-skill complementarity holds iff σ2 < σ1, regardless of which
elasticity measure is used. We are well aware that the Allen-Uzawa elasticity as a measure of substi-
tutability lacks the salient theoretical properties the Hicksian elasticity of substitution exhibits in the
two-goods case (cf. Blackorby and Russell, 1989). Since most of the empirical literature deals with that
measure, however, we also stick to it.
37
labor accordingly. The values of σ1, σ2, σ3 are computed from (26) recursively:
σ1 = σK,H
1
, σ2 =
c2Y2
c1Y1
(
σK,H
2
− σ1
)
+ σ1,
σ3 =
c3Y3
c1Y1
(
σK,H
3
− σ1 −
c1Y1
c2Y2
(
σ2 − σ1
))
+ σ2.
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8.5 Simulation Results
Table 5.6
Long-run impact of aging on key macro variables
in percentage changes relative to initial steady state.
Key macro variable σ = 0.3 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.7
r Real interest rate* 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
D f /Y Debt − GDP ratio* 0.250 -0.219 -0.360 -0.596
zs PAYG contributions 39.394 39.394 39.394
w1 Wage-rate low skilled labor -0.719 -0.967 -1.725
w2 Wage-rate medium skilled labor -0.113 -0.150 -0.257
w3 Wage-rate high skilled labor 0.378 0.506 0.895
l1 Low skilled labor supply -0.288 -0.388 -0.694
l2 Medium skilled labor supply -0.045 -0.060 -0.103
l3 High skilled labor supply 0.151 0.202 0.357
W1,1
(t),t
Low skilled human wealth p.c. 1.436 6.660 18.851
W2,1
(t),t
Medium skilled human wealth p.c. 1.125 4.595 13.585
W3,1
(t),t
High skilled human wealth p.c. 1.058 3.914 12.036
∆V1 Utility difference 1 -5.431 -7.295 -12.851
∆V2 Utility difference 2 -5.294 -7.049 -12.116
N1 Low skilled individuals 2.939 3.987 7.240
N2 Medium skilled individuals -0.027 -0.049 -0.156
N3 High skilled individuals -2.015 -2.707 -4.784
NW Number of workers 0.000 0.000 0.000
NR Number of retirees 39.394 39.394 39.394
K Capital stock -0.003 0.106 0.397
Y Gross domestic product, GDP 0.068 0.201 0.568
C Aggregate consumption -2.343 -2.928 -3.758
A Aggregate assets -17.382 -22.510 -31.096
Notes: Pension benefits p.c. and public consumption p.c. constant;W s,a
α,t = H
s,a
α,t + S
s,a
α,t ;
*) absolute values, initial values in first column.
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Table 5.7
Long-run impact of a two-year retirement postponement on key
macro variables in percentage changes relative to initial steady state.
Key macro variable σ = 0.3 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.7
r Real interest rate* 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
D f /Y Debt − GDP ratio* 0.250 0.103 0.090 0.071
zs PAYG contributions -18.196 -18.196 -18.196
w1 Wage-rate low skilled labor 0.231 0.245 0.275
w2 Wage-rate medium skilled labor -0.077 -0.072 -0.062
w3 Wage-rate high skilled labor 0.028 0.018 -0.006
l1 Low skilled labor supply 0.092 0.098 0.110
l2 Medium skilled labor supply -0.031 -0.029 -0.025
l3 High skilled labor supply 0.011 0.007 -0.002
W1,1
(t),t
Low skilled human wealth p.c. 0.982 1.526 2.786
W2,1
(t),t
Medium skilled human wealth p.c. 0.742 1.059 1.769
W3,1
(t),t
High skilled human wealth p.c. 0.974 1.217 1.763
∆V1 Utility difference 1 0.489 0.578 0.765
∆V2 Utility difference 2 1.371 1.491 1.751
N1 Low skilled individuals -0.257 -0.303 -0.401
N2 Medium skilled individuals -0.162 -0.167 -0.180
N3 High skilled individuals 0.504 0.548 0.643
NW Number of workers 3.622 3.622 3.622
NR Number of retirees -16.131 -16.131 -16.131
K Capital stock -2.545 -2.454 -2.245
Y Gross domestic product, GDP -2.553 -2.464 -2.258
C Aggregate consumption -3.685 -3.659 -3.542
A Aggregate assets -7.837 -8.239 -8.741
Notes: Pension benefits p.c. and public consumption p.c. constant;W s,a
α,t = H
s,a
α,t + S
s,a
α,t ;
*) absolute values, initial values in first column.
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